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European Central Bank working paper series 33In certain market environments, a large investor may beneﬁt f r o m
building up a futures position ﬁrst and trading subsequently in the spot mar-
ket (Kumar and Seppi, 1992). The present paper identiﬁes a variation of this
type of manipulation that might occur in money markets with an interest
rate corridor. We show that manipulation involving the use of central bank
facilities would be observable only sporadically. The probability of manipu-
lation decreases when the central bank uses an active liquidity management.
Manipulation can also be reduced by widening the interest rate corridor.
JEL classiﬁcation: D84, E52
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October 2004Non-technical summary
Money markets with interest rate corridors dier institutionally from other
m a r k e t ss u c ha ss t o c km a r k e t so rm a r k e t sf o rﬁxed income instruments. This
paper identiﬁes a kind of manipulation that might occur in such a money
market. The strategy is to build up a signiﬁcant position in short-term
interest rate instruments (swaps or futures), and to aect the short-term
market rate subsequently using the standing facilities provided by the central
bank. In contrast to alternative forms of manipulation, the impact on short-
term prices is achieved not mainly by trading activities, but by a strategic
use of the standing facilities of the central bank. The paper oers a model
that allows to derive the manipulator’s optimal strategy in a market that is
aware of the possibility of manipulation.
The main prediction of the model is that manipulation in money markets
would occur only from time to time. Two comparative statics results are
obtained. Firstly, the likelihood of manipulation decreases with the size of
the reaction that the market rate exhibits in response to a strategic recourse
to the central bank facilities. Thus, with an active liquidity management
that neutralizes manipulative actions in due time, the central bank has the
means to ensure that attempts to control the market rate will in general not
be successful. The analysis also shows that manipulation becomes less likely
in systems with a wider interest rate corridor. This suggest a new theoretical
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October 20041. Introduction
Major central banks around the world increasingly focus on steering some
short-term money market interest rate in their implementation of the mon-
etary policy stance. This is, for example, the case of the Federal Reserve in
the US, the European Central Bank (ECB) in the euro area, and the Bank
of England in the UK. More broadly, central banks around the world seem
to increasingly attach greater value to stable, day-to-day and even intra-
day money market conditions. With this aim, so-called corridor systems
have been adopted, for example, in Australia, Canada, the euro area, New
Zealand and the US. More recently the Bank of England announced that it
is also considering adopting such a system (see Bank of England [4]).
In a corridor system, the central bank stands ready to provide overnight
liquidity in unlimited amounts, generally against collateral, at a rate some
basis points above market rates (lending facility); and stands ready to absorb
liquidity overnight in unlimited amounts at a rate some basis points below
market rates (deposit facility). By setting a corridor around the central bank
target or policy rate, the range of variation of overnight interest rates will be
bounded, on a day-to-day and intra-day basis, by the rates on the standing
facilities, allowing short-term market interest rates to be steered with limited
volatility around the desired level. This reduces the noise that short-term
liquidity conditions may cause to the signalling of the monetary policy stance
(see Woodford [12]).
Further stabilization of money market interest rates can be achieved by in-
troducing a reserve requirement system with an averaging provision. Under
6
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October 2004this framework, banks have to maintain a daily positive reserve balance at
the central bank, which has to reach a certain value on average over a main-
tenance or statement period. The stabilization of overnight interest rates
works through an arbitrage mechanism. As a tool for liquidity management
by commerical banks that is complementary to transacting in the inter-bank
market, the reserve account at the central bank can be run down or increased
on a daily basis. Thus, intuitively speaking, temporary or small liquidity im-
b a l a n c e sc a nb ea b s o r b e db yv a r i a t i o n si nq u a n t i t i e sr a t h e rt h a np r i c e s .I n
fact, during most of the maintenance period, an individual bank’s demand
schedule will be highly elastic around the interest rate level expected to pre-
vail at the end of the maintenance period. However, when the end of the
period approaches, the demand schedule becomes increasingly inelastic as
quantitative targets for reserves must be met.
The combination of a corridor system with an averaging mechanism provides
a powerful framework to stabilize the overnight interest rate, as shown in
Quirós and Mendizábal [10]. However, it appears that the issue of the appro-
priate design of standing facilities is still largely unexplored in the literature.
Recently, Furﬁne [6, 7] shows how an improper design of the marginal lending
facility may lead to its use being greater than what would be expected from
the characteristics of the interbank market; and that a stigma from using
the standing facilities may lead to its use being lower than what would be
desirable to reduce interest rate volatility.
This paper wishes to contribute to the ongoing discussion on the appropriate
design of corridor systems by showing that, from a theoretical perspective,
7
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mercial bank, obliged to hold minimum reserves on average over a statement
period, might have build up a signiﬁcant red position over the period for
some reason, so that it would look as an attractive possibility if market rates
were temporarily lower to ease reﬁnancing. To create lower rates, the bank
may take up a credit from the central bank, lending the money subsequently
out into the market. Under certain conditions, this would generate a drop
in the market rate, adding value to the red position. In fact, this strategy
could be even more successful when the manipulator builds up a swap or
futures position beforehand. We will discuss under which conditions this is a
proﬁtable strategy, and which incentive eects are created by this possibility.
We will also discuss some of the means at the disposal of the central bank to
eliminate this kind of behavior.
Market manipulation is a topic that has attracted signiﬁcant attention during
the last two decades. According to a useful classiﬁcation by Allen and Gale
([1]), dierent forms of manipulation can be sorted into the three categories
action-based (e.g., the analysis of manipulation around takeovers contained
in Bagnoli and Lipman [3] and Vila [11]), information-based (e.g., by gu-
rus as suggested by Benabou and Laroque [5]), and trade-based, which can
either be informed (e.g., the study of manipulation around seasoned equity
oerings by Gerard and Nanda [8]) or uninformed (e.g., the study of stock
price manipulation due to Allen and Gorton [2]).4
4Other more recent forms of manipulation that are currently discussed in the media
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the proﬁtability of manipulation in futures markets with cash settlement.
Their model falls into the category of uninformed trade-based manipulation,
while ours could be interpreted as one of action-based manipulation. The
dierence between our model and Kumar and Seppi’s is the cost structure
underlying manipulative strategies. In our model, the manipulator can aect
the market only by having recourse to standing facilities, which means that
a non-marginal spread must be paid for a manipulation of the market rate.
As we will see, this aects the optimal strategy of the manipulator, when
compared to Kumar and Seppi’s prediction, in a potentially relevant way.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we analyze
the problem of the manipulator under the assumption of an exogenous price
eect in the swap market. We discuss the consequences of endogenizing the
price eect on the manipulator’s strategy in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
The appendix contains technical derivations.
2. Exogenous price eect in the swap market
The time structure of our model is as follows (cf. Figure 1). At time w =0 ,
there is a swap market where banks and larger companies trade interest rate
swaps that cover the last day of the statement period. At time w =1 ,t h a ti s ,
on the evening before the last day of the statement period, there is the option
available to the manipulator to have recourse to a credit or deposit facility.
The net recourse to central bank facilities is published in the morning of the
last day of the period. In w =2 , that is, during the last day of the statement
period, spot trading occurs.
9
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endowment [0  Q(0>2
0) in the swap. This initial position may be the
result of trading with non-bank customers, and is assumed to be private
information to the manipulator. We will use the convention that a long
position (e.g., [0 A 0) means that the manipulator receives the variable
leg, and that a short position means that the manipulator pays the variable
leg. This convention has the consequence that a long position in the swap
makes increasing market rates desirable, and declining rates undesirable for
a manipulator with a long position.
At time w =0 , the manipulator submits a market order of [1. In addition to
the market maker, there are noise traders in the swap market, submitting an
additional order volume of \  Q(0> 2
\). Total order volume is then given
by
] = [1 + \ .
We will assume initially that a market maker is willing to clear the swap




for some exogenous A0. I tw i l lb e c o m ec l e a rt h a tt h em a r k e tm a k e r ,
when assumed to follow the usual no-proﬁt condition, would use a non-linear
pricing rule. An extension of the model incorporating this possibility will be
discussed in Section 3.
We assume that the market at time w =2does not suer from informational
10
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Ignoring autonomous factor shocks (they would cancel out in expectation),
we may assume that the market rate depends only on the net recourse to
standing facilities V, so that the spot rate amounts to
u(V)=u
0  V,
where A0 is the liquidity eect on the last day. Standing facility rates
are given by uO for the marginal lending facility and uG ?u O for the deposit
facility. We assume that the corridor is symmetric around the central bank’s






Controlling the market rate. Expected proﬁt for the manipulator is given















for the interest rate that the manipulator either pays for having recourse to
the marginal lending facility or that she receives for depositing money with
the central bank.
The model is solved backwards. The ﬁrst order condition in w =1equalizes
the marginal beneﬁt from manipulation with the marginal cost of manipula-
tion
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termediary result. See Figure 2 for illustration.
Proposition 1. For given swap position [ = [0+[1, the optimal strategic
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Proof. See the appendix.¶
Thus, a manipulator who has build up a su!ciently large red position in
the swap market ([ ¿ 0) will have recourse to the marginal lending facility
(VA0) to cause prices to fall, while a manipulator with a su!ciently large
black position ([ À 0) will have recourse to the deposit facility (V?0), and
proﬁt from the tightening of the market.5 In contrast to Kumar and Seppi’s
[9] model, we ﬁnd that manipulation is not always proﬁtable. Speciﬁcally,
there is an intermediate range for the swap position [ where manipulation
of the spot rate does not pay o. This is due to the non-marginal cost of
having recourse to standing facilities, which is, as mentioned earlier, the main
dierence between our model and the one used by Kumar and Seppi.
Building up a position. Proceding backwards, we now pose the question
of how the manipulator chooses the swap order. Plugging the optimal usage
5In practice, this position taking could also be accomplished by satisfying reserve re-
quirements unevenly over time, but we ignore this possibility for reasons of simplicity.
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carefully considering the resulting problem for the manipulator at date w =0 ,
we obtain our next main result:
Proposition 2. Assume that the liquidity eect in the spot market is not
too large when compared to the price impact in the swap market, i.e., ?4.
Then, for a given initial swap position [0, the optimal swap order size is
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Proof. See the appendix.¶
The above result stresses the ee c tt h a tam a r k e tp a r t i c i p a n tm a y ,i na n -
ticipation of proﬁtable opportunities to control the market rate, have an
incentive to leverage her position in the swap market. When the initial posi-
tion is su!ciently red ([0 ¿ 0), the manipulator will increase her exposure
by going further short in the swap market ([1 ? 0). Subsequently, she will
inﬂate reserves in the market by having recourse to the marginal lending
facility (VA0). Conversely, when the initial position is su!ciently black
([0 À 0), then the long position will be further enlarged ([1 A 0), and the
manipulator will subsequently draw reserves from the market.
Proposition 2 illustrates another dierence to Kumar and Seppi’s model. In
their model, there is (endogenously) no price eect in the futures market,
13
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unless hindered by a margin requirement. In the present model, the optimal
position in the swap market may be either ﬁnite or inﬁnite, depending on
the relative size of price eect in the swap market and liquidity eect.6 In
the case considered in the Proposition, we ﬁnd an optimal ﬁnite position.
The dierence to Kumar and Seppi’s model that drives this eect seems to
be that in their model, a large order in the futures market implies that the
price in the spot market will increase not only due to manipulative trading,
but also due to the changing expectations of the market specialist in the spot
market. Note that this link is not present in our model. As a consequence,
the futures (swap) rate in our model exhibits a reaction to the order ﬂow,
which is not the case in Kumar and Seppi’s analysis.
The probability that the manipulator does not leverage her position in equi-
librium is given by














It is not di!cult to see that the expression on the right-hand side decreases
in . Thus, the larger the liquidity eect ,t h em o r el i k e l yw i l li tb et h a tt h e
manipulator will leverage the initial position. Similarly, if the interest rate
corridor is tightened by either decreasing the lending rate uO or by increasing
the deposit rate uG or both, then the probability of manipulation increases
6In fact, as we will see, there are parameter values for which the endogenously deter-
mined price eect in the swap market generates ﬁnite positions. So the ﬁniteness of the
position is not an artifact of the exogenity of the price eect.
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interest rate corridor “too much” may be detrimental to the objectives of
monetary policy implementation.
Several manipulators The main prediction of the present paper is that
in a corridor system of monetary policy implementation, and under suitable
conditions, an individual bank may ﬁnd it worthwhile to make strategic use
of central bank standing facilities. This provokes the question as to why
there should be only one potential manipulator. If su!ciently proﬁtable, we
would expect any commercial bank to stand ready for such activities. How-
ever, the theoretical analysis suggests that a strategic recourse to central
bank facilities would be proﬁtable only under the very restrictive condition
that the potential manipulator possesses a secretly acquired and su!ciently
large position in short-term interest rate instruments. In fact, if the initial
position were public information, then it should be expected that the market
maker would request a mark-up on futures prices, making manipulation un-
proﬁtable. Thus, manipulation would be very unlikely, and the coincidence
of two or more banks making simultaneously strategic usage of central bank
facilities may be neglected without much loss.
In practice, the decision to manipulate will depend not only on the initial
endowment but also on (i) the overall trading and collateral capacities of
the bank, (ii) its general readiness to take strategic measures in the search
of proﬁt opportunities, including the involved daringness vis-à-vis the cen-
tral bank and potentially other regulatory institutions. For these reasons,
we would expect that even in a large currency area, only few banks may
15
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Depending on the central bank’s stance on this issue, it may also be di!cult
for an individual bank to repeat an unwanted manipulative strategy. In sum,
it appears that in practice other reasons may amplify the sporadic nature of
manipulation, so that the restriction to just one manipulator does not seem
as a serious qualiﬁcation for the validity of the predictions.
3. Endogenous price eect
We have noted before that the linear price rule of the market maker in the
swap market may not correspond to a zero-proﬁt condition. Indeed, the non-
linear strategy used by the manipulator suggests that the pricing rule should
take this behavior into account. In this section, we will discuss the question





for some twice dierentiable function (=). N o t et h a tw ea r eb a c ki nt h e
previously studied case when (])  ].
The plan is now to calculate, from (=), ﬁrst the optimal order size for the
manipulator, then the resulting distribution of orders [1,a n dﬁnally, the
market maker’s posterior beliefs about [1 given ]. When these posterior
beliefs correspond to (=),w eh a v ei d e n t i ﬁed an equilibrium.
Note that the more general form of the pricing rule in the swap market does
not aect the manipulator’s problem in the spot market. Thus, Proposition 1
16
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tor’s problem of choosing [1 in the swap market so as to maximize expected
proﬁt.








the manipulator will not leverage the initial position, i.e., [1 =0 .O u t s i d e

















Proof. See the appendix.¶
For illustration, the reader may refer to Figure 3, which shows the size of
the swap order [1 as a function of the initial position [0 in a simulated
example. The illustration suggests two features of the equilibrium. On the
one hand, as before, the manipulator refrains from leveraging small initial
positions. On the other hand, and in contrast to the model with exogenous
pricing, the extent of leverage declines for larger initial positions. The reason
is that in the model with endogenous pricing, the market maker responds to
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[1 with an atom at [0 =0 .D e n o t eb yi(=) the density of [1, satisfying





In equation (1), we have derived a formula for pr{[1 =0 }, i.e., for the
probability mass of the atom. With the help of the previous proposition,
the density of the distribution for values [1 6=0can be calculated as a
transformation of the distribution of the initial position.

















is the density of the standard normal distribution.
Proof. See the appendix.¶
We proceed by calculating the price eect from the optimal strategy. The
market maker in the swap market will form expectations about the extent of
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for [1 6=0 . The functional equation (4), complemented by equations (2), (3)
and (5), speciﬁes the endogenous price eect in the swap market.7
Numerical computation. The functional equation that determines the
price eect in the swap market is highly non-linear so that we doubt that
an explicit solution is feasible. We have therefore used numerical methods
to discuss the properties of the equilibrium. We think that the intuitions
gained are interesting, so that we will brieﬂy describe the computations and
the results.
To ﬁnd the non-linear equilibrium, we have used the standard method of
approximating ﬁxed points of a functional operator by iterating the operator.
The functional operator has been programmed as follows. Starting from an
approximation 0(]) of the pricing rule, given by its values on a number of
sampling points in a pre-speciﬁed interval. We have then used methods of
numerical integration to calculate sampling points of the smoothed function
b ([1) on a somewhat smaller interval. The derivatives b 0([1) and b 00([1)
7There exists an analogous formula for the case [1 =0 , but this formula need not be
spelled out because the integrand in (4) vanishes at zero.
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which can be found using integration by parts. From the thereby derived
approximations, the density function i([1) could be calculated on sampling
points using the expression given in Proposition 4. This in turn allowed to
determine the conditional density g([1|]) for any given value of ],a g a i n
on a number of sampling points. This makes it feasible to numerically ap-
proximate (]) as given by (4), for a given ]. Varying now ] over the same
set of sampling points, we obtain a new approximation 1(]) for the price
eect in the swap market. The obtained approximation was then extended
linearly to the larger set of sampling points (corresponding to the larger in-
terval). This procedure was iterated, so that a sequence of approximations
(q(=))qD0 was generated, where each q(=) was deﬁn e do nt h es a m es e to f
sampling points. Unfortulately, we have no formal argument that the ap-
parent point-wise limit of the established sequence is an equilibrium of our
model with endogenous price eect. However, the results are intuitive.
The resulting pricing eect in the swap market is predicted to be very low
for small values of ], and somewhat larger when ] becomes big (cf. Fig-
ure 4). This property of the pricing rule is due to the fact that for small
20
ECB
Working Paper Series No. 399
October 2004absolute values of ], the market maker’s posterior assigns a relatively large
probability to the atom [1 =0 , so that the likelihood of a leverage strategy
is perceived to be small in the swap market. However, for larger values of
], the posterior probability assigned by the market maker to a manipulative
strategy increases overproportionally with ]. This is because the posterior
probability of the atom [1 =0decreases exponentially when ] grows lin-
early. The range of values for [1 in which the manipulator leverages her
position remains the same as before. However, as Figure 5 illustrates, the
non-linear price eect in the swap market induces the manipulator to lever-
age her position somewhat stronger for smaller (in absolute terms) initial
positions when compared to the linear set-up studied before. This behavior
yields a very particular shape of the ex-post distribution of the market orders
[1.S p e c i ﬁcally, the density i([1) is bimodal (cf. Figure 6). The density
again determines the speciﬁc form of the posterior, which suggests that the
numerical computations have in fact approximated an equilibrium, and the
results of Section 2 appear to be robust with respect to endogenizing the
price eect in the swap market.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we have pointed out that in money markets that are embedded
in a corridor system, composed of central bank lending and deposit facili-
ties, there is the potential for manipulative action that abuses these facilities
in a strategic way. Speciﬁcally, we mentioned the example of a bank that
builds up a large short position in the market for short-term interest-rate
instruments, and that subsequently oers interbank credit at very low rates,
21
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type of manipulation can be proﬁtable for a bank with suitable ex-ante char-
acteristics. In addition, we have seen that manipulation remains a feature of
the equilibrium even if the market responds to the possibility of manipulation
with a rational-expectations adaptation of the pricing rule.
The comparative statics analysis showed that the likelihood of manipulation
increases with the liquidity eect. This supports the common understanding
that with suitably chosen ﬁne-tuning operations, the central bank has the
means to ensure that attempts to control the market rate will in general not
be successful. In fact, one could argue that the availability of ﬁne-tuning is
a necessary condition for avoiding such kind of manipulative recourses. The
second insight from the comparative statics analysis is that the likelihood
of manipulation decreases with the width of the interest rate corridor. This
suggest a new theoretical rationale for having the rates not “too close” to
the target or policy rate. In fact, when these costs of a tighter corridor are
balanced with the beneﬁt of cutting o the spikes of non-strategic interest
rate volatility, the analysis provides a intuitive foundation for an optimal size
of the interest rate corridor.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume ﬁrst that [  0. In this case, it cannot
be optimal to choose VA0, i.e., to manipulate the price downwards, because
V =0avoids the costs for having recourse to the marginal lending facility,
and does not lower the value of the overall position. Thus, VW  0 for [  0.
22
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A completely analogous argument can be made for the case [?0,w h i c h
yields the assertion.¶










Consider ﬁrst the problem where the manipulator is restrained to make an





([1  [1)  0,( 6 )
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+ Vu(V)  Vu
O
= [0V  [1(V + [1)+V(u
0  V)  Vu
O.( 8 )









































The constrained problem has a solution if and only if the second-order condi-














However, since [1  [1 by assumption, the interior solution cannot be
optimal for [1 ? 0.T h u s , f o r [1 ? 0,i . e . ,f o ras u !ciently large initial
long position, the optimal solution of the unconstrained problem satisﬁes
[1  [1, so that the manipulator does not use the marginal lending facility.
Step B. Consider now the manipulator’s problem under the constraint [1 5
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0 if [1  0
[1 if [1 ? 0
.( 1 0 )
We have seen in Step A that for [1 ? 0, the optimal solution of the un-
restrained problem satisﬁes [1  [1. By completely analogous arguments,
one can show that for [1 A 0, the optimal solution of the unconstrained
problem satisﬁes [1  [1.T h u s ,i f[1 ? 0 and [1 A 0 are satisﬁed simul-
taneously, then the optimal solution lies in the interval [1 5 [[1;[1],a n d
from (7), we obtain [W
1 =0 .
Step C. Assume now that [1 ? [1  0. From Step B, we know that then the
optimum must lie in the interval [[1;4). But in this interval, the problem







Hence, for [1 ? [1  0,w eg e t[W
1 = [
+
1  0. Now assume that [1  0.
Then clearly [1 A 0. By considerations analogous to those performed in the
previous two steps, we obtain that in this case [W
1 := [
3










1 if [1 ? [1  0
0 if [1 ? 0 ? [1
[
3
1 if 0  [1 ? [1
.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2.¶
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .The manipulator chooses [1 in the swap market
so as to maximize expected proﬁts
b ([0>[ 1>]>V)=[0(u(V)  u
0)+[1(u(V)  u
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H[b ([1>V)] = [0V  [1(V + b ([1)) + V(u
0  V)  Vu
O@G(V),
where





































0([1)}  [1.( 1 1 )
We start from the hypothesis that this equation gives an implicit expression
for the optimal order [
3
1 in the swap market for a non-linear pricing rule in
the considered. The corresponding equation for the case is given by [0 =










whose implicit solution will be denoted by [
+
1 .¶
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 .To determine i(=),d e n o t eb yI(=) the cumulative
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A similar argument can be made for [1 A 0. This proves the assertion.¶
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Figure 2. Net usage of standing facilities as a function of the manipulator‘s total
swap position.

















Figure 3. Equilibrium swap trading as a function of the manipulator‘s initial
position. The curvature of the graph shows that small initial positions are
leveraged at lower marginal costs.
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Figure 4. Equilibrium swap spread as a function of the total order volume. The
price effect of demand in the swap market can be seen to be comparably low

















Figure 5. Net usage of standing facilities as a function of the initial position.
Manipulation occurs with probability smaller than one.
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Figure 6. Non-normal ex-post density of the manipulator‘s swap order flow.
Note: the distribution possesses an atom at X1 =0 .
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